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OBSERVATIONS OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AS A
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
DONALD P. LAYt
INTRODUCTION

Following my announcement that I was stepping down as
Chief Judge and taking senior status after having served as an
active judge on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for twentyfive years, I received many letters from lawyers, judges, and lay

people from all parts of the country. One of my friends wrote
that she felt it was the end of an era in the sense that, as of
January 7, 1992, no active judge would be on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals who had presided when I was appointed
by President Johnson in 1966. My announcement has caused
me to reflect on the many changes that have taken place on the
court of appeals over the past quarter century. For historical
anecdote, I have tried to recall some of the great judges with
whom I have worked, as well as some of the significant cases
and memorable incidents.
My RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
My relationship with the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit started several years before I was appointed
to the court in July of 1966. As a trial lawyer, I had the privilege of bringing several cases before the Court of Appeals in
the late 1950s and 1960s. I have fond memories of these cases.
I always looked forward to arguing them at the federal courts
building in St. Louis, Missouri. It was during this time that I
became impressed with the caliber of the judges who sat on the
circuit's bench. I found the court proceedings to be highly dignified, with the judges always alert, knowledgeable, and respectful to the bar.
I recall several trips where I would leave Omaha, my resit Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Judge
Lay was appointed to the Eight Circuit on July 6, 1966, by President Lyndon B. Johnson. He became Chief Judge on January 1, 1980, and he assumed senior status on
January 7, 1992.
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dence at the time, by boarding the Missouri Pacific sleeper at
night, taking the train to Kansas City and then into St. Louis,
getting into the Union Station at 7:30 a.m. I would argue my
case during the day and then return to Omaha on the next
night's sleeper.
At the time, the Chief Judge of the court was the Honorable
A.K. Gardner, a man in his nineties. With Minnesota's John B.
Sanborn and Nebraska's Harvey M. Johnsen and Joseph W.
Woodrough, who were all in their seventies and early eighties,
the Gardner court was composed of some of the most elderly
jurists in the country. Also sitting on the court in those days
were Judges Martin D. Van Oosterhout of Orange City, Iowa,
Charles J. Vogel of Fargo, North Dakota, Al Ridge of Kansas
City, and Charles Matthes of St. Louis. Judge Harry Blackmun
of Minnesota was appointed to the Eighth Circuit in 1959. He
was followed by Judge Pat Mehaffy of Arkansas in 1963 and
Judge Floyd R. Gibson of Missouri in 1965. I argued cases
before all of these judges except Judge Floyd Gibson.
I once argued a bankruptcy case on a jurisdictional point
where a creditor of my debtor-client had placed him into bankruptcy.' The creditor was a franchisor from New York, and we
filed a counterclaim against it for several thousand dollars asserting breach of contract. 2 We could not get jurisdiction over
the creditor on the counterclaim other than in New York. I
successfully moved to dismiss the bankruptcy action on the
3
ground that there existed more than twelve creditors.
In the 1950s, the district judge often wore two hats; one as a
bankruptcy judge and one as a district judge. I tried to utilize
the bankruptcy action as a basis to obtain jurisdiction in Nebraska, but the district court dismissed the case on the ground
that the bankruptcy court could not entertain a common law
action for breach of contract other than as an offset to any
bankruptcy claim.4 Again, I successfully moved to dismiss the
bankruptcy action on the ground that there existed more than
1. See Associated Elec. Supply Co. v. C.B.S. Elec. Sales Corp., 288 F.2d 683, 684
(8th Cir. 1961).
2. Id.
3. Id. "[U]nder Section 59, subdivision b of the Bankruptcy Act, a single creditor was not qualified to file an involuntary petition if the alleged bankrupt has twelve
or more creditors." Id. at 684; see also 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988).
4. Associated Elec. Supply Co., 288 F.2d at 684.
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twelve creditors.5 I argued, however, that the district court
should have continued jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim. The case law was against us, but I urged the court to
follow Professor James Moore, who maintained that the separation of the district judge from a bankruptcy judge was a mere
fiction, and as such, it was not logical to recognize a distinction
between bankruptcy and a federal court's general jurisdiction. 6
Judge Sanborn, who was an expert in bankruptcy law, asked
me whether I wanted the court to follow the law or follow a law
professor? I forget my exact response, but I do recall Judge
Sanborn's parting statement to me: "Anyway Mr. Lay, we will
give you an E for effort." Needless to say, I lost the case.7
In other court of appeals cases, I received favorable decisions upholding at least three fairly substantial verdicts. As an
appellant, I also obtained three reversals. As I recall, in each
case, Judge Van Oosterhout orJudge Vogel wrote the opinion.
Regardless of the outcomes, I always thought they were great
judges.
In 1964, I filed an antitrust suit and breach of contract action
in Nebraska for a client in Denver, Colorado, against McGrawEdison Company, an Ohio corporation. McGraw moved for a
change of venue to Denver. Judge Robert Van Pelt of the
United States District Court of Nebraska, whom I consider to
be the greatest trial judge I ever appeared before, denied the
section 1404(a) motion to transfer. 8 There could not be an interlocutory appeal on an order denying a change of venue.
McGraw's counsel, however, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals and asked that the case be heard by
the court en banc. In another decision handed down a few
years earlier, the court of appeals had ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for writ of mandamus on a
discretionary ruling of a trial court. 9 Judge Harvey M. Johnsen
of Nebraska, who I succeeded on the court four years later, had
5. See supra note 3.
6. See JAMES W. MOORE
CEDURE (1962).

ET. AL., MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-

7. See Associated Elec. Supply Co., 288 F.2d at 683.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1989). "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
9. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Hyde, 245 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1957).
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dissented in that earlier case.' ° When McGraw-Edison was argued before the court en banc in 1964," Judge Johnsen was
the Chief Judge, and both Sanborn and Gardner, who had
formed the earlier majority, were no longer on the court. We
were successful in sustaining Judge Van Pelt's ruling denying
the motion to transfer.12 JudgeJohnsen had assigned the writing of the opinion to himself. Unfortunately, he was not
known for producing his opinions in a very expeditious manner. As it was told to me years later, one reason for these delays was that, for over five years, the judge worked without a
secretary or a law clerk because he felt he was saving the government money. Judge Johnsen had the McGraw-Edison case
under advisement for over eighteen months before finally sustaining Judge Van Pelt's denial of the motion to transfer.'"
In the meantime, while awaiting the decision, the case in the
district court sat in limbo. My client was having a great deal of
financial difficulty with McGraw-Edison. During the delay, he
lost all monies he had available to pursue his case in the federal court. My client filed bankruptcy as a result, and when
Judge Johnsen's ruling finally came down, the client lacked any
funds to pursue the original lawsuit in district court. Shades of
Charles Dickens. That case personified for me the old saying
4
that "justice delayed is justice denied."''
The effect of that case upon my client created a lasting impression upon me. During my tenure on the bench, I have
been persistent in urging our court to dispose of opinions in as
short a time as possible. The courts of appeals throughout this
country should adopt mandatory procedures to follow the policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which resolves that every appellate decision should be written within
10. Id. at 538-42.
11. See McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965).
12. Id. at 364. The reason I mention this case is because it was the first case
heard by the court of appeals en banc in ten years.
13. Id.
14. "Justice delayed is justice denied" is one of the three qualities of justice discussed by Sir Edward Coke in his exposition of the Magna Carta. According to Coke,
justice must be "free, for nothing is more iniquitous than justice for sale; complete,
for justice should not do things by halves; swift, for justice delayed is justice denied
.
David
.. Schuman, Oregon's Remedy Guarantee:Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon
Constitution, 65 OR. L. REV. 35, 37 n.19 (1986) (quoting Edward Coke, 2 INSTITUTES
OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 55-56 (4th ed. 1671), and translating from Latin into
English).
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three months. With the volume of work that a circuit judge has
today, this is very difficult to do. Delays of six months to two
years are common on most courts of appeal. However, with
self-discipline and the application of proper management principles, adhering to the three-month timetable can, and should,
be done. There are few reasons why cases cannot be
processed in ninety days. The public should demand it. The
court should strive, wherever possible, to meet these
deadlines.
My

APPOINTMENT TO THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

I had the privilege of being appointed to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1966. At that time I was thirty-nine years
old. I was recently reminded of my appointment when I received a nice note from the Honorable Barefoot Sanders, distinguished Chief Judge for the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas. Barefoot was with the United
States Justice Department in 1966. He was kind to recall that
both he and Nicholas Katzenbach, then United States Attorney
General, were actively involved in my appointment.
My first few years on the court were exciting to say the least.
Because I had argued several cases before Judge Van Oosterhout and Judge Vogel, I was quite apprehensive when I was
initially assigned to hear cases on a September panel with
then-Chief Judge Vogel and Judge Van Oosterhout. The first
calendar on which I sat scheduled three cases a day. For any
case on appeal, regardless of merit or size, counsel received
thirty minutes for oral argument.
The first night that I had dinner with Judge Van (as we all
came to call him) and Judge Vogel was somewhat uncomfortable for me. It was at the Mayfair Hotel in St. Louis. I had always looked up to both of these judges with great respect and
admiration. To realize that I was now their colleague and peer
was indeed an awesome experience at the time. I proceeded to
call them both "Judge" until finally Charlie Vogel, in a joking
way, told me that if I did not start using first names he was
going to start calling me "Judge." He was such a great friend;
he made me feel quite at ease. I recall how all of the judges
made this transition easy for me; they were all congenial and
helpful.
The first case I heard as a judge, in September 1966, was a
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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very difficult patent case.' 5 I had read the briefs several times
and still did not understand what function the patented device
served. Skilled Washington and New York patent lawyers had
presented their argument using various charts and diagrams.
However, no one explained what purpose the invention
served. I decided that, in order to make an intelligent vote on
the case, I needed to ascertain the use of the invention. I
thought perhaps I had missed some obvious explanation. At
the end of the argument, after sheepishly apologizing to the
lawyers for asking what probably sounded like a foolish question, I asked if they "would be kind enough to tell me for what
use or function the patented device served." I recall that one
of the lawyers beamed and said he would be glad to explain.
He turned to one of the complex diagrams in the courtroom
and explained that the device was a "form" used to hold lead
wires when constructing a suspension bridge. It was incredible
to me that no one had ever informed us of this in either the
briefs or during oral argument. After asking the question, I
still felt foolish since I believed somehow I should have figured
out the answer.
Shortly thereafter we took a recess, and as I walked into the
robing room, Charlie Vogel put his arm around my shoulder
and said, "Don, I am sure glad you asked that question because
I didn't know either." I remember how much that comment
made me feel at ease and at home with the court, and I have
felt that way ever since.
For many years, members of the court stayed together at the
Mayfair Hotel in St. Louis. We would generally meet for
breakfast and lunch, and then in the evening, we would get
together in someone's room before going to eat either at the
Mayfair or the Athletic Club. The rooms were small and I can
still remember then-Judge Harry Blackmun sitting on the floor
along with some of the rest of us. There was a lot of "togetherness," which made for a great collegial court. There were
never any open disagreements or bad feelings.
One of the early stories I recall about the court occurred in
1967. At that time, the court sat for two weeks in the spring
15. Since the creation of the Federal Court of Appeals, courts of appeals no
longer hear patent cases. I think this unfortunate. Specialized courts will never provide the objective analysis afforded by a generalist court. Patent cases were often
difficult but fascinating to work on.
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and for two weeks in the fall with two panels sitting. This
meant that all eight judges would be in St. Louis for two weeks.
The weekends were deadly. By Tuesday of the second week,
even though we were hearing only three cases a day, everyone
was very tired. We came to the winter court meeting and
Judge Blackmun stated that he did not know whether anybody
had noticed, but the two week spring term fell over the Easter
weekend. Chief Judge Vogel said that he had sat away from
home on many Easter weekends and it did not bother him.
Judge Van stated that he saw nothing wrong with it. Judge
Blackmun immediately noted that it did not bother him either,
he just "wanted to bring it to everyone's attention." Although
I was one of the newest members on the court, I finally spoke
up and said that it was of some concern to me because I had
five children at home and I would like to be with them over
Easter. At that point, Judge Vogel said that there was no motion on the floor and that there would have to be a motion if
anything was to be changed. There was a thirty second silence.
I then sheepishly moved that we not have the two week session
in April. Judge Floyd Gibson seconded my motion and we
voted. Judge Heaney, another new member of the court,
judge Gibson, and I voted for the motion; the other five
judges, including Judge Blackmun, abstained.
The following year we were still planning to hold the twoweek session in October. I suggested that instead of sitting for
two consecutive weeks in the fall, we move one of the fall
weeks to December. The court had never sat in December because it was considered to be a busy time at home. There was
general discussion about the fact that we had never sat in December before. Judge Van Oosterhout, who was Chief Judge
at that time, stated he did not want to sit in December. The
motion barely passed. After that, I was one of the three judges
who sat in St. Louis every December. Bob Tucker, who was the
clerk of court, for many years called the December session "the
Lay term of court."
IMPORTANT CASES DECIDED DURING THE

1960s

We heard several significant cases during my first years on
the bench. One significant case was Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
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Co. ,16 the panel for which consisted ofJudge Blackmun, Judge

Mehaffy and me. This case presented a novel challenge under
the Thirteenth 7 and Fourteenth'" Amendments against racial
discrimination in private housing. 9 The Civil Rights Act of
1968,2" wherein Congress created a cause of action for discrimination in private housing, had not yet been passed. Our
court reasoned that since private parties were involved, the existing law recognized a cause of action under the United States
Constitution only where there was state action. We expressed
a desire to find a cognizable claim under the Constitution, but
felt that the law, as it existed at that time, did not provide us
with that authority. Judge Blackmun cogently analyzed the
case law that existed at that time. 2 ' The Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari on the case, and we were all pleased
when, in a landmark decision, we were reversed. 2
In another interesting case, Standard Oil of New Jersey sued
Standard Oil of Indiana in an attempt to dissolve the 1937 injunction which broke up the Standard Oil monopoly.23 This
was a dispute over the use of trademarks by these competing
oil companies. Our court determined that the 1937 injunction
should remain in place and that the distinctive trademarks that
had been developed by New Jersey and Indiana should not be
infringed upon or used by either of them. 24 The plaintiffs argued that the credit cards were interchangeable; thus the
trademarks should be interchangeable as well.25 We reasoned
that there had not been a sufficient change of circumstances to
26
allow dissolution of the injunction.
Humble Oil stands out in my memory for two reasons. First,
the district court had held two of the oil company attorneys in
contempt of court because it felt that they had perjured themselves at trial. Second, there was a good deal of attention
16. 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. See generally Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d at 37.

20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
21.

Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d at 37.

22. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
23. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
24. Id. at 819.
25.

Id. at 815.

26. Id. at 820-21.
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given to the case by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard
Oil of Indiana, as well as the national bar. Over thirty attorneys from both oil companies sat in the courtroom that day
and listened to the arguments.
The case was argued by Richmond Coburn from St. Louis
and Judge David Peck of Sullivan and Cromwell in New York.
Each side had over an hour for oral argument and both counsel were thoroughly prepared. I later became acquainted with
Judge Peck and he told me that he had spent over two weeks
preparing his oral argument for that case. He also produced
the most complete, thorough, and interesting printed record
that I ever examined while on the court, filling over sixteen
volumes with many color plates. In fact, I still have a copy of
that record in my library today.
In the years since we heard Humble Oil, I have had the opportunity to tell both Judge Peck and Richard Coburn that they
both made the finest appellate oral arguments ever presented
before me during my twenty-five years on the court. An interesting aside to this litigation is that as a result of losing the
case, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey went on to spend
several million dollars in developing a new trademark which is
now familiar throughout the United States: Exxon.
Judge Gerald W. Heaney of Minnesota came on the court six
months after I did, in December of 1966. Upon his arrival on
the court of appeals, Judge Heaney immediately established
himself as a scholar and a proponent for equal rights. He took
an early interest in the school integration cases. This interest
continues to the present time. He has written on integration
law in cases arising out of Little Rock, Omaha, Kansas City,
and St. Louis. I generally voted with him on these issues; in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were a few occasions
when we were in the minority. He and I always felt that the
district courts were reacting too slowly under the "deliberate
speed" concept.2 7 The majority of the court disagreed with us,
however, and continued to uphold the discretion of the district
courts.
One of the interesting en banc cases that we heard at that
27. See Rogers v. Paul, 345 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1965); Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d
256 (8th Cir. 1960); Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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time was the Tinker case out of Des Moines, Iowa.2" Judge Roy
L. Stephenson of Iowa was the district judge. The Tinkers
were a family of Quakers. The Tinker children wore black arm
bands to school to protest the Vietnam War. Because of this,
the principal at their school in Des Moines suspended them.
The parents supported their children and refused to have them
take the arm bands off. Judge Stephenson sustained the school
board's action of upholding the suspension of the children.2 9
Three of us on the panel believed that the suspension encroached upon the freedom of speech and religion granted in
the First Amendment and that there was no basis for the suspension. Judge Blackmun and Judge Heaney agreed with me,
but the vote in conference was five to three to sustain the district court. Judge Van Oosterhout then stated that he thought
it would be better if we did not write any opinion. He thereafter changed his vote to make it four to four so that the decision
would simply sustain the district court without precedential
value. I mentioned during the conference that I thought I
would still like to write something because I felt there were
important First Amendment rights involved. Judge Van Oosterhout said that if I did that, he would then change his vote
back to make the majority five to three. I then withdrew my
request, and the en banc vote was issued four to four. Fortunately, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
eight to one, holding, in a landmark decision, that the school
board had violated the children's constitutional rights under
the First Amendment.
Another important case in the late sixties was Spinelli v.
United States. 30 That case involved a gambler in the St. Louis
area who had used interstate wires and travelled back and forth
between Illinois and St. Louis in setting up a gambling ring.
The FBI, after staking out Spinelli, obtained a search warrant
to search his apartment where gambling paraphernalia was
found and seized. 3 '
The key issue on appeal was whether, under the Fourth
Amendment, there was probable cause to issue the search war28. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
29. Id.
30. 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
31. Id. at 878.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/13

10

1992]

Lay: Observations of Twenty-five Years as a United States Circuit Judg
OBSERVATION OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

rant.3 2 Judge Heaney, in a panel opinion, joined by Judge Van
Oosterhout, ruled the search unconstitutional as the search
warrant lacked probable cause. The panel opinion was vacated
and the case was placed en banc.3 3 The majority, which I
joined, held that there was sufficient indicia to warrant a finding of probable cause for the search.3 4 Judge Heaney and
Judge Van Oosterhout joined in writing a strong dissent.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a landmark
decision, reversed our court.3 5 The Supreme Court adopted
the dissenter's view of the case that probable cause for the
search was lacking.3 6 I remember that when the decision came
down, the FBI agent who had been out working on the case for
many months came into the clerk's office in St. Louis and
openly cried in front of Bob Tucker because all the hard work
that he had done in staking out Spinelli had gone down the
drain. The decision was significant since it established controlling case law for over twenty years as to the parameters of
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Its importance
has not diminished, despite the totality of circumstance rule
later announced in Illinois v. Gates.3 7
Judge Myron H. Bright of North Dakota joined the court in
1968. He, along with Judge Heaney, took strong stands in
favor of civil rights. I have always felt that he, along withJudge
Heaney, rank among the nation's great circuit judges. On one
occasion, Judge Heaney, Judge Bright, and I were sitting on an
appeal in an Arkansas integration case in which the district
court had held the counsel for the school board in contempt of
court.38 We were forewarned by the FBI that there would be a
group of irate citizens coming to hear the appeal and that some
of them might be dangerous. The FBI recommended that we
station marshals on the floor and in the courtroom. Two busloads of people drove up to Little Rock to hear the case. I was
presiding. We addressed them respectfully and told them that
there were some very important issues that would be ad32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
1971),

Id. at 884.
Id. at 895 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 894.
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Id. at 419.
462 U.S. 213 (1983); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
See United States v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. No. 24, 446 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059 (1972).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992

11

William Mitchell
Law Review,
Vol. 18,LAW
Iss. 3 [1992],
Art. 13
WILLIAM
MITCHELL
REVIEW

[Vol. 18

dressed, and as such, we would appreciate their utmost courtesy and quiet in the courtroom.
The main thrust of the school board's counsel's argument
was that Brown v. Board of Education 9 should be overruled. Ob-

viously, we had no authority to do that and certainly did not
feel that Brown had in any way been decided incorrectly. After
we heard the case, we received a courteous letter from one of
the citizens in attendance telling us that they appreciated the
respect that the panel had extended to counsel by listening intently to the arguments. We held the case for about three
months and then summarily affirmed.4 ° Within a few days, a
letter was received by the court threatening our lives. We
turned the letter over to the FBI, but fortunately nothing came
of it.
I mention this story because a few months after we decided
the Arkansas case, Judge Heaney, Judge Bright, and I together
sat on another integration case. One of the lawyers for the Little Rock School Board, who was opposing the remedial orders
of the district court, called our clerk of court, Bob Tucker, to
determine who would comprise the panel hearing the case.
Bob told him that the panel was Judges Lay, Heaney, and
Bright. Immediately the lawyer said over the phone, "Oh
S*?! ". After that, Tucker jokingly called the three of us the
"Oh S*?! Panel" whenever we sat together.
DECISIONS DURING THE BURGER COURT ERA

One of the more interesting cases I have heard on the Eighth
Circuit was In re Weitzman. 4 1 A twenty-seven-year-old woman,
born in South Africa of Jewish parentage and married in Tel
Aviv, Israel to a United States citizen, applied for citizenship
but refused to take the oath requiring her to pledge to bear
arms on behalf of the United States. She asserted that her objection was as a matter of conscience, but she did not believe in
a Supreme Being or religion. In denying her citizenship, the
district court found she could not claim to be a conscientious
objector because she did not believe in a Supreme Being as
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 446 F.2d at 933.
41. 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970).
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required in the citizenship oath.4 2 The citizenship oath included in the naturalization act was the same as the conscien43
tious objector clause under the selective service laws.
At conference, then-Judge Blackmun, Judge Heaney, and I
were all somewhat undecided. Judge Blackmun voted to uphold the constitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.4 4 Judge Heaney felt that the statute would be unconstitutional unless those who sincerely objected as a matter of conscience would be excused from bearing arms. He construed
the statute in that fashion. Thus, he voted to reverse. I wrote
that I would not pass on the constitutionality question notwithstanding Weitzman's claim that she had no religion. I found
within her testimony, evidence that she did, in fact, possess a
"religious belief" because her pacifism derived from a belief in
instinctive natural law analogous to humanism, which the
Supreme Court had held to be a recognized religion.45 I wrote
that "citizenship [should not] be denied because the belief of
the petitioner46is not in conformity with an acceptable definition
of religion."

Judge Heaney's opinion was perhaps closer to the ultimate
resolution by the Supreme Court a few years later in Welsh v.
United States,47 where the court held that a statement of sincere
conscience was sufficient, otherwise the statute would be unconstitutional.4 " I have received several letters from professors around the country who felt that the opinion had great
value for teaching freedom of worship under the First Amendment. I recall it to be one of the most fascinating cases on
which I ever worked.
It may be surprising to know that Judge Heaney and I, in
those early days, wrote several dissents to opinions by Judge
42. In re Weitzman, 284 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1968), rev'd, 426 F.2d 439 (8th
Cir. 1970).
43. Weitzman, 426 F.2d at 439. At that time, there was a great deal of litigation
over the conscientious objector clause under the selective service laws during the
Vietnam War.
44. Id. at 462 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1988)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 459 (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946)).
46. Id. at 458.
47. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
48. In Welsh, the petitioner was convicted for refusing to be inducted into the
armed forces. The petitioner's statements that he believed the taking of life "to be
morally wrong," together with the court of appeals' conclusion that the petitioner's
beliefs were held "with the strength of moral traditional religious convictions," allowed the petitioner conscientious objector status. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 13
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Blackmun. Because of our apparent philosophical differences,
I knew he was concerned that we would not give him our full
support when he was nominated to the Supreme Court. I felt
badly about this because there was no question that Judge Heaney and I were pleased that a member of our court received
an appointment to the Supreme Court. Despite our differences, we always considered him to be a good friend. We both
knew that he was a scholarly judge and deserving of the appointment. After he was nominated, Judge Heaney and I went
down to his office in St. Louis to greet him, and to shake his
hand and wish him well. He said that he was relieved that we
came to see him because he was afraid that we might oppose
him.
There is no question that, because of our earlier disagreements, Judge Heaney and I had reservations as to just how far
the new Burger Court would change the humanitarian approach taken by the Warren Court. However, Justice Blackmun, in a few years began to assert a judicial philosophy much
different from that which we had perceived on the court of appeals. Today, he is recognized as one of the greatest constitutional scholars on the Court.
Another one of the more interesting cases that I sat on was
Morrissey v. Brewer.4 9 Morrissey raised the question of whether
the revocation of parole required due process notice and hearing before a parolee could be returned to prison. This case
declared, for the first time, that the "hands-off" doctrine no
longer applied to state prisoners, and that the due process
clause was applicable to state prisoners. 50
The hands-off doctrine was based on the idea that a parolee
was in constructive custody of the state and, as such, he was
not entitled to due process. The appeal came before an administrative panel of our court. Two judges determined that
the appeal was frivolous. Bothjudges voted to sustain the trial
court's dismissal. It seemed fundamental to me that a state
prisoner was "a person" for due process purposes, and that
the "state," in depriving him of his "liberty" by returning him
to custody, denied him due process of law by failing to provide
any kind of notice or informal hearing. With this basic concern, I requested that the court place the case en banc to re49. 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
50. Id.
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consider our earlier rulings. The court heard the case en banc
and endorsed the old "hands-off" rule; Judge Heaney, Judge
Bright and I dissented.'
The Supreme Court, which by this time included Justice
52
Blackmun, granted certiorari and unanimously reversed.
The Court held that the state had to afford a parolee in the
position of Morrissey a hearing before it could revoke his parole and return him to prison.5 3 This case was a landmark decision for prisoners' rights. Since that time, thousands of cases
have applied the due process clause allowing state prisoners to
have notice and hearing before the state can deprive them of
their liberty interest.
One of the more unusual cases that we heard occurred back
in the middle seventies. A non-profit corporation in Dubuque,
Iowa, brought suit in federal court. The district court allowed
the corporation to proceed in forma pauperis. The relevant
statute 54 speaks in terms of an "indigent person" being allowed to proceed without payment of fees. A paucity of case
law at that time indicated that a non-profit corporation could
not proceed as a "person" under that statute. Nevertheless,
district court Judge Edward McManus in Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
55
certified the corporation as a pauper and the trial proceeded.
The corporation lost the case and appealed. Thereafter,
Judge McManus' court reporter requested payment for the
transcript furnished to the non-profit corporation for use on
appeal. The Administrative Office of the Courts refused payment under section 753(0 of the United States Code on the
basis that the corporation did not qualify to proceed in forma
pauperis. 56 Judge McManus wrote to the Director of the Administrative Office, General Rowland F. Kirks, to seek reimbursement. General Kirks responded that he could not do so
because the law did not allow a corporation to proceed in
forma pauperis. Various letters were then exchanged between
Judge McManus and the Administrative Office. The relationship between the judge and General Kirks deteriorated to the
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
missed,
56.

Id. at 952-64 (Lay, Heaney and Bright, Jj., dissenting).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
See River Valley v. Dubuque County, 63 F.R.D. 123 (N.D. Iowa), appeal dis507 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1974).
See 28 U.S.C. § 753(0 (1988).
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point that Judge McManus' law clerk and Kirks' clerical assistant assumed most of the correspondence. Each letter became
more terse. Finally, Judge McManus held that General Kirks
was in contempt of court for failure to comply with his order.57
I first learned of the case while reviewing for an upcoming
court term. I noted that counsel from the Department of Justice was planning to travel from Washington, D.C., to argue
the case on behalf of General Kirks. The corporation's counsel
was to appear on behalf of Judge McManus. The amount involved was less than $500. I telephoned both counsel to see if
the case could be settled. I felt that, since the government
would spend thousands of dollars prosecuting the appeal,
there should be some room for compromise. Any attempt to
compromise, however, was proven futile. General Kirks was
angry and wanted the case argued.
After argument, I assigned writing the opinion to myself.
The panel was concerned with the precedential effect of holding the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts in contempt. During my study, I realized that,
even if the law did not allow a corporation to proceed in forma
pauperis, the original order of Judge McManus had become
final. The United States Attorney had not appealed the district
court's original order. Of course, when judge McManus issued
the order, General Kirks was not a party to the case. Nevertheless, I discovered that, in the original action, the United States
Attorney's Office had represented the federal agency who sued
the non-profit corporation. Therefore, the government had
received notice and had failed to appeal the order. On this
basis, we determined that General Kirks, as an agent of the
government, was bound by the district court's order. Our
court ruled that the Director must pay the judgment since the
original order was res judicata.58
Under the circumstances, we were confident the Director
would pay the judgment and the contempt would be dissolved.
Shortly after the opinion came down, I received a call from
Justice Blackmun, who was then our associate justice. He said
that Chief Justice Burger was upset because our court had upheld the contempt order. When the decision came down, General Kirks, who was not a lawyer, had called the Chief Justice
57. River Valley, Inc. v. Dubuque County, 507 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1974).
58. See id. at 582.
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and told him that our court had upheld the contempt order. I
told Justice Blackmun to show our opinion to the Chief Justice.
I explained that our court had decided the case under principles of res judicata and it had nothing to do with holding Kirks
in contempt of court. In any event, after several months and
additional correspondence, the Director finally authorized the
Administrative Office to pay the amount. The contempt citation was dissolved.
RESERVE MINING LITIGATION

Some of the more dramatic incidents on the court occurred
during the Reserve Mining Litigation.59 The United States,
the states of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and several
environmental groups sought an injunction ordering Reserve
Mining Company to cease discharging wastes from its iron ore
processing plant in Silver Bay, Minnesota, into the air of Silver
Bay and the waters of Lake Superior, reasoning that the iron
tailings contained asbestos fibers. There was speculation that
digestion of the tailings that contained the fibers might cause
cancer of the stomach or other internal organs. The district
court granted the injunction, ordering that the discharges immediately cease, thus effectively closing the plant.' Reserve
Mining Company appealed the order, and we stayed the injunction pending resolution of the merits of the appeal, because we determined there was no credible evidence in the
trial court record to sustain the injunction. 6' Although the
health issue was paramount, the evidence was entirely speculative. A balancing concern of the panel was the fact that if the
plant were immediately shut down, approximately three thousand people would be thrown out of work. Also in balance at
that time was a business which was vital, not only to the company, but to the State of Minnesota as well.
The case was appealed on the merits. The court determined
that dumping tailings polluted Lake Superior and that Reserve
Mining Company should cease the dumping and take affirmative steps to purify the water.6 2 The state favored a dump site
59. See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974),
modified in partsub nom., Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
60. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. at 21.
61. Reserve Mining Co., 514 F.2d at 537.
62. Id. at 538.
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called "Mile Post Twenty," which was named such because it
was twenty miles distant from the plant. Mile Post Twenty,
however, was cost-prohibitive for the company. The company
had an alternative site called "Mile Post Seven," which it argued would be both economically feasible and safe. However,
our court held that the selection of sites was an issue for the
state agencies. 63
The district judge publicly challenged the court of appeals'
decision. Many viewed his remarks as judicially improper and
unethical. Thereafter, he held a hearing sua sponte to determine dumping sites for the tailings. He called his own experts
and refused to allow the lawyers to do more than listen. He
declared the lawyers for both sides incompetent and stated
that he would do all direct and cross-examinations of the witnesses. He subpoenaed the various members of the state environmental protection agency to come to his courtroom. He
allegedly locked the courtroom and would not allow anyone to
leave during the hearing. Somehow, one of the lawyers was
able to get word of the closed proceeding to his firm. A petition for writ of prohibition and mandamus was filed before our
court in St. Louis. 64
Three judges recused themselves for various reasons, and
only five members of the court entertained the writ. We immediately issued a temporary injunction against the district judge
and ordered that further hearings be held in abeyance until
65
such time that we could entertain the motions for the writ.
The court scheduled the hearing on the writ of prohibition in
St. Louis a few days later. ChiefJudge Gibson recused himself.
Before the arguments were scheduled, much to my chagrin
and surprise, the district judge asked two lawyers who were
close friends of mine to call and ask me whether he should
orally argue his own case. I said that the district judge had to
make up his own mind. I knew that some of our judges were
very disturbed because he had defied our court order. I was
worried that if he argued the case, a verbal altercation might
occur in open court, which would be as unfortunate for the
court as it might be for the judge. Alternatively, if the district
judge were removed from the case and told not to appear, he
63. Id. at 539 n.87.
64. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 182 (8th Cir. 1976).
65. Id.
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would likely have claimed that I had somehow denied him due
process.
When the scheduled hearing date arrived, we heard arguments from all parties for almost four hours. The district
judge was present in the courtroom. At 5:00 p.m., I inquired
whether, even though it was late, he wished to say something
to the court. He did. He read a statement concerning his position on the case. It was written in a respectful way and was not
argumentative. I was very relieved. Once again, I was concerned that some of our judges would get into a verbal exchange with the district judge which would not, at least in
appearance, reflect well for the court or the district judge.
At the conclusion of his statement, as presiding judge, I
thanked him. The district judge then stated, "This is my formal statement; now I would like the court to ask me some
questions." I informed him that it had been a long day and the
court did not have any questions. The five judges of our court
all agreed that no one would ask the district judge any questions if he did speak. It was unfortunate that the proceeding
did not stop at that point.
The district judge said, "Then I've got some more things
that I want to say." He put down his prepared text and emotionally lectured the court on how wrong we were in questioning his judgment. He said that his position was taken in the
interest of the people who were going to die in the future. I
always recall his statement, "They say I'm an advocate. Of
course, I'm an advocate; anyone would be an advocate in my
position." As I recall, even the Minnesota Daily, the student
newspaper at the University of Minnesota, which had supported the district judge's rulings in favor of the environmentalists, wrote an editorial recognizing the judicial impropriety
of the district judge's statement. I wrote an opinion which all
judges signed:
[The judge] seems to have shed the robe of the judge and
to have assumed the mantle of the advocate. The court thus
becomes lawyer, witness and judge in the same proceeding,
and abandons the greatest virtue of a fair and conscientious
judge-impartiality.
Disregard of this court's mandate by a lawyer would be
contemptuous; it can hardly be excused when the reckless
action emanates from a judicial officer. It is one thing for a
district judge to disagree on a legal basis with ajudgment of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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this court. It is quite another to openly challenge the
court's ruling and attempt to discredit the integrity of the
judgment in the eyes of the public.6 6
A few years later, the same district judge had a dispute with
A.H. Robins Co., the makers of the Dalkon Shield contraceptive. Robins filed a complaint under the Judicial Discipline and
Conduct Act 6 7 alleging that the district judge had abused his
judicial power in comments and actions taken during the
course of litigation. 6 8 As a result, our Judicial Council conducted the only investigative hearing it has held in twelve years
under the Judicial Discipline Act.
As ChiefJudge, I appointed a five-judge committee to review
the evidence. We convened the investigative committee with
two other circuit judges and two districtjudges. I sat as Chief
Judge. The district judge requested an open hearing. Representing the district judge was Ramsey Clark, the son of Justice
Tom Clark. Representing Robins was Griffin Bell, a long-time
friend of mine who had been a judge on the Fifth Circuit and
Attorney General under President Carter. News correspondents came from all over the country. The courtroom was
packed.
During the hearing, we discovered, through the oral
presentations, that the district judge's conduct arose out of litigation which was on direct appeal. We determined that the
district judge's conduct could be reviewed on appeal of the
original case. We dismissed the judicial complaint on the theory that it arose out of ongoing litigation, which was not really
under the scope and jurisdiction of the Judicial Discipline and
Conduct Act.6 9 The district judge publicly stated that our dis-

missal of the case had vindicated him from all charges. Of
course, this was not true. We simply took no action in the disciplinary proceeding. In the opinion written on the appeal, the
70
court cited the district judge for abuse of judicial power.
A short time later, the same district judge was charged under
the same Discipline Act by the Washington Legal Foundation,
66. Lord, 529 F.2d at 185-88.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988).
68. See Dean v. A.H. Robins Co., 101 F.R.D. 21 (D. Minn. 1984).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988).
70. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
dictrict court's reprimand violated the due process rights of the defendant and its
officers).
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for judicial misconduct. The district judge was challenged for
using the bench as a forum to express his social views. In a
sentencing case, he praised two young war protesters for damaging a computer at Sperry Rand. 7 ' He said, "What is so sacred about a bomb, so romantic about a missile? Why do we
condemn and hang individual killers, while extolling the virtues of warmongers." 7 2 He had also been on 60 Minutes where
he spoke disrespectfully concerning ChiefJustice Burger, President Reagan, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Although I found his comments disrespectful, as ChiefJudge, I
dismissed the complaint because I felt not to do so would serve
to chill the independence of a federal judge to freely comment
on cases pending before him. However, I wrote:
Although federal judges enjoy the independence accorded
them under the Constitution, every judge should at the
same time be keenly aware that the independence of the
federal judicial branch depend[s] in large part on public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
In performing the duties of ajudicial officer, it is incumbent
upon a federal judge never to be swayed by outside partisan
interests or private causes. These are principles of public
accountability, which guide all federal judges, because they
provide the basis for public trust in the judicial branch of
government. When a judge fails to display objectivity and
impartiality in a given case, the judge not only creates prejudice in the litigation before the court, but he or she also
sacrifices the public trust in the neutrality of the judiciary.
While the former can be corrected through the normal
channels of appellate review, the latter damage may be irreparable. If the public loses its confidence in the fairness
of the judicial system, public acceptance of the rule of law is
weakened.73
I received many letters that expressed both agreement and disagreement with that decision.
In the late 1970s, we heard an interesting case involving the
Omaha Indian's claim to land on the Missouri River. Judge
Roy Stephenson, Judge Smith Henley, and I sat on the case. A
lawsuit was filed on behalf of the Omaha Indian Tribe alleging
that their reservation had existed back in the early 1800s and
71. See In re Lauer, 788 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1985).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 138.
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had been washed away by various avulsive movements of the
Missouri River. After a lengthy trial, the district court determined that the Tribe had not shown that the land they once
possessed as a reservation was washed away by avulsive movements of the river, rather than the gradual erosion of the
land. M
Congress passed a statute in 1834 which declared that if a
white person made a claim to lands that were once possessed
or owned by Indians, then the burden of proof would be on
the white person to demonstrate that the title had passed.75
The trial court refused to apply the statute. On appeal, we
held the statute applicable. We reversed the district court,
holding that the white persons had not carried their burden of
proof, and established the title in the name of the Indians.76
A disappointing thing happened after the original case was
decided. One of the landowners' attorneys spoke at various
community luncheons. In describing the historic case, he publicly declared that the court's decision was "a political one"
which had nothing to do with the law. I have always been troubled by lawyers who place the blame for losing a court decision
on "politics" of the court. I suppose this occurs when lawyers
need an excuse for losing a case. They fail to realize that, by
blaming the politics of the court, they create a general disrespect for the judicial system.
PERSONALITIES ON THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

In 1967, when Ramsey Clark became Attorney General
74. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Iowa 1977), vacated sub nom.,
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated, 442 U.S. 653
(1979). Under the avulsive theory, the title to the land would remain with the Indians, whereas under the accretion theory, the title to the newly formed land would be
transferred to the owner where the land settled.
75. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 22, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (current version at 25
U.S.C. § 194 (1988)). This statute reads:
In all trials about the right of property in which an Indian may be a party on
one side, and a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest
upon the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption
of title in himself from the fact of previous possession or ownership.
25 U.S.C. § 194 (1988).
76. Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated, 442
U.S. 653 (1979). Although the Supreme Court vacated our opinion, our interpretation of the statute was upheld. On remand, we reinstated our original finding.
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 825

(1980).
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under President Lyndon Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark, his father, resigned from the Supreme Court. Justice Clark was an
old friend who indirectly aided my appointment to the court of
appeals. As head of the National Conference of State Trial
Judges, Justice Clark assumed a mission to educate state trial
judges throughout the country. His primary goal was to upgrade the knowledge and technique of trial judges so that state
courts could become more competent. He organized a series
of state judge seminars which led to the creation of the National College for State Trial Judges in Boulder, Colorado. Ultimately, after receiving a grant from the Fleischman
Company, a permanent national college for state trial judges
was built in Reno, Nevada.
After Justice Clark left the Supreme Court, we invited him to
sit on our court. He sat on various courts of appeals throughout the country but always told me he enjoyed sitting with the
Eighth Circuit the most. He visited our court many times.
One of the more humorous incidents which occurred on our
court involved Justice Clark. I tell this story at various bar
meetings when speaking on oral advocacy. The representative
of the estate for a deceased employee was suing the employer's
insurance company for double indemnity by reason of the alleged accidental death of the employee. The tragic events that
led to the employee's death centered around his constant
abuse of his wife. After one particularly intense domestic quarrel, the wife announced to the employee, "If I had a gun I
would shoot you." He told her to wait a minute. He then
walked into the bedroom, took out a gun from a dresser
drawer, gave it to his wife and said, "Go ahead and shoot me."
She did. He died as a result of the gunshot. The wife was convicted of manslaughter. Their five children were left without a
father and, for all practical purposes, without a mother. The
estate of the deceased brought suit for benefits on behalf of the
children on the ground that the death was accidental. The district court ruled that the death was not accidental but was
caused by the employee's willful conduct.
On appeal, the lawyer for the estate filed a very short brief.
It was no more than five pages and, as I recall, did not contain
any citation to law. The insurance company's attorney was well
prepared and cited many cases purporting to support the district court's finding that the death was not accidental. At the
close of the argument, the estate's lawyer asked if he could
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have a moment to make a personal statement. I told him that
the court had a full morning but that we would give him a few
seconds to say what he wanted to say. He then stepped forward and stated, "I want the court to know that today is the
proudest day of my life as a lawyer. I have never had the opportunity and privilege to argue a case before a Supreme
Court Justice. Today I have the great personal privilege to argue a case before the Honorable Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court." He then added, "I
am going home to tell my grandchildren that I was here and
appeared before Justice Clark." When he concluded and
stepped back, Tom leaned over the bench and said to counsel,
"I appreciate very much your remarks. I want you to know
something. I am going home to tell my grandchildren that you
were here." With that we concluded the morning session and
we adjourned court. As I walked down the steps into the robing room, Tom put his arm around me and said, "You know,
Don, I think we ought to reverse that last case."
I assigned the case to myself. After considerable study, I became convinced the better reasoned cases required us to award
the insurance money to the estate." I have always held that
case out to lawyers and law students as the most persuasive
oral argument that I ever heard.
Justice Clark had a great retentive memory. On one occasion we heard an admiralty case. After oral argument, Justice
Clark leaned over the bench and asked plaintiff's counsel,
"Didn't you used to clerk for Bill Brennan?" The lawyer said,
"Yes, sir." Tom said, "I thought so. I remember you." The
lawyer was Richard Arnold, who has now succeeded me as
Chief Judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.
Justice Clark wrote his opinions in long hand as he flew from
one city to another. He often called me from an airport and
asked me to visit with him about a case. Sometimes he would
visit with me for close to an hour. After a while he would say,
"I think I've got it." In a few short days, I would receive his
proposed opinion, always concise and to the point.
He told me that he always regretted his role as Attorney
General concerning the Japanese internment camps in Califor77. See Estate of Wade v. Continental Ins. Co., 514 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975).
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nia. He said that Justice Black, who wrote the opinion, 78 also
expressed regret over the decision. Tom told me that Earl
Warren, who was then the California Attorney General, also
acknowledged sorrow in proceeding so precipitously. The nation was at war, and the national hysteria affected the wisdom
of three great men.
The last time I saw Tom Clark was after we sat together in
St. Louis in 1977, the year of his death. We rode out to the
airport together in a taxi. When we arrived, I had approximately thirty minutes to catch my plane to Omaha. Tom had
an hour left to get on his plane to Washington. When we
reached the main terminal, we discovered our gates were at
opposite ends of the airport. I began to say goodbye. He responded that he would walk me to the plane since he had
plenty of time and liked to visit. He waited for me to board my
flight before walking all the way back to the other end of the
airport. I will always remember that. He was one of the most
warm, gracious individuals I have ever known. 9
One of the best-liked judges who visited the Eighth Circuit
during the 1970s was Talbot Smith, a senior federal district
judge from the Eastern District of Michigan. Talbot had been
a teacher at the University of Missouri in his younger days and,
after serving in the Navy, he settled in the federal government
in Michigan back in the early 1950s. When he was on the
Supreme Court of Michigan, he wrote an opinion which recognized, for the first time, that under common law, a wrongful
death of a child had substantial compensatory value.80 At that
time, the general rule was that the measure of damage for the
wrongful death of a child had to be calculated under the fiction
of what the plaintiff could prove the infant child would have
contributed to the family. Professor William Prosser gives Talbot great credit for his revolutionary decision. 8"
78. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
79. Justice Clark was also one of the most thoughtful persons I ever knew. When
I was a lawyer, he always wrote a long handwritten letter to me every time I appeared
on one of the state trial judge programs. He always expressed his appreciation and
added personal comments as well. He also wrote to all the state judges who participated in the program. When I was sworn in as a lawyer to the bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Justice Clark wrote a little note from the bench, and gave
it to the bailiff, asking me to please stop by his chambers to visit.
80. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. 1960).
81. See W. PAGE
53 (5th ed. 1984).
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In 1960, Talbot had written a dissent in a case that involved
the question of one man, one vote. 2 He wrote that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution had been violated by the
denial of one man, one vote in the state legislature.8 3 At that
time, most courts rejected such claims as political questions.8 4
This was a few years before the landmark reapportionment
case of Reynolds v. Sims. 5
Talbot told me that he received a note from Roscoe Pound,
the great Harvard law dean, who wrote that he was delighted
with Talbot's dissent and wondered if Talbot and his wife
would come to Boston and visit with him about the case. Invitations like that are few and far between, so Talbot and his wife
packed their bags and took the train to Boston to visit Dean
Pound. They went out to his home the first evening to have
dinner.
Talbot told me he had done a good deal of reading about
Pound's life to be certain he had a topic for conversation. Talbot had read that the Queen of England had recently
presented Dean Pound with an extraordinary distinguished
cross for his contribution to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. After
dinner, they were visiting, and Talbot told Dean Pound that he
and Mrs. Smith would be so delighted to see the medal. At
that point, Pound stiffened and said, "Absolutely not." After
regaining his composure, Talbot once again broached the subject. He observed again that both he and Mrs. Smith would be
so pleased to see the medal and the great honor bestowed
upon him. At this time, Pound turned toward him and said,
"Under no circumstance." Mrs. Pound then intervened and
said, "Oh, Roscoe, show them the darn medal." Pound stood
up and said, "Follow me." They went into the bedroom and
Dean Pound opened the top drawer of the dresser. Talbot told
me that there were over a hundred different medals and ribbons in the drawer that Dean Pound had received over his lifetime. Dean Pound picked up the medal, turned to Talbot, and
said, "To have pride is to sin." He then put the medal back in
the dresser and shut the drawer. I have always treasured that
story.
82. See Scholle v. Hare, 104 N.W.2d 63, 84 (Mich. 1960) (Smith, J., dissenting),
vacated, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
83. Id. at 98.
84. Id. at 95.
85. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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After his stint on the Michigan Supreme Court, Talbot
served on the district court for the Eastern District of Michigan. When he took senior status, he had an ongoing personal
feud with one of the judges on the Sixth Circuit and preferred
to sit with our court, rather than the Sixth Circuit. Talbot was
a congenial person. He adopted the Eighth Circuit as his
home away from home, and we always enjoyed sitting with
him. He provided great services to our court.
Judge Roy Stephenson came on our court in 1971. I believe
that Judge Stephenson was one of the great district judges in
the circuit. I always found that he treated lawyers fairly, and he
was certainly respected in the Iowa bar. Several persons told
me when Roy came on the court that the two of us would not
get along because of our different philosophical views. I knew
from some of the cases we heard in which he was the trial
judge, such as Tinker 86 and Morrissey v. Brewer 87 that perhaps
we did disagree on certain philosophical directions of the law.
I was confident, however, that we would get along very well.
We shortly became very close friends. Roy, Gerry Heaney,
Bob Tucker, and I went on many fishing trips together up at
Judge Heaney's cabin in Canada. We always had a great time.
Roy knew that I had tried many jury cases, and he would always
joke that "Don and I are the two jury lawyers" on the court.
We always believed in the jury verdict and were very hesitant
to reverse a verdict of a jury.
Perhaps the saddest event on the court over the last twentyfive years occurred when Judge Stephenson took his own life.
Everyone knew that his wife, Betty, had been ill for a long time.
Roy always traveled with her and took care of her. We would
always say that there was going to be a place on high for Roy
because of the tremendous care and love that he had shown his
wife over the years. Many people speculated as to why Judge
Stephenson took his life. I am not sure. I know that just
before the installation of Judge Fagg, who was his successor,
Roy called me and read to me a short message that he was
going to give at Judge Fagg's installation. His voice quivered;
it was so unlike him to express such a lack of confidence as to
86. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
87. 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 13
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

what he was doing. I certainly was alarmed but had no idea
how serious his situation was at that time.
While holding court in St. Paul, we received the telephone
call that Judge Stephenson had taken his own life. It was the
darkest day of our court. I arranged for all of the judges to fly
to Des Moines for the funeral. On behalf of the court, I gave
the eulogy. Some of my remarks I include here:
Roy Stephenson was our colleague on the Court of Appeals for 11 years; for 11 years before that he served on the
United States District Court for the Southern District of

Iowa.
No man performed more nobly; no man has ever given
more to the cause of justice than Roy Stephenson.
He was the fairest of the fair, his integrity was respected
by all, his dedication to his work and to his court was known
throughout the nation. He was a judge's judge. His advice
and wisdom was constantly sought by his colleagues.
Although he firmly believed in swift punishment of those
who violated the law-he never hesitated to set aside any
conviction which was not fair within the bounds of due process. Above all else as a judge he knew the value of impartiality-he was the rare man who was always able to rise
above the faults and prejudices of his inner self and to see
and think and decide on higher ground. The great judge is
the one who can set aside his personal belief as to the best
result and use only the law as his helmsman. Roy Stephenson was such a judge. He was a people's judge. He long
respected the jury system and seldom saw need to set aside
a verdict of twelve men and women in a case tried fair and
true.

Judge Charles Matthes of St. Louis was Chief Judge of the
Eighth Circuit from 1970 to 1973. He was a very fair judge
and was respected by everyone. The other members of the
court gave great deference to his handling of administrative
matters. This beneficial policy continued under Judge Vogel,
Judge Van Oosterhout, Judge Floyd Gibson, and me. 88 The
court has had many internal disagreements over the years but
they were always worked out and, for the most part, there were
88. In 1973,Judge Matthes stepped down to allow Judge Pat Mehaffy to serve as
Chief Judge for a short period of time. He served for less than a year. At the time,
Pat was experiencing illness and was not very active. Before his appointment, Pat was
an able business man and lawyer. He was a fine judge and was loved by everyone
who knew him. He also enjoyed a close friendship with Harry Blackmun.
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never any hard feelings or lasting disagreements among the
judges.
Judge Matthes was perhaps one of the most popular Chief
Judges during my time on the court. He was a mild mannered
person who always tried to be fair in his assessment of the
cases before him. He told me that one of his first cases on the
court was Aaron v. Cooper, 9 which came in the aftermath of
Brown v. Board of Education.90 An Arkansas trial judge had suspended the order mandating integration of the Little Rock
High School on the ground that it would lead to violence. 9 '
The case was argued to our court en banc.92 Judge Matthes,
the youngest judge on the court, was asked by Chief Judge
Gardner to write the opinion as soon as possible because it was
an expedited appeal and needed immediate attention. Judge
Matthes told me that he had to cancel a family vacation in order to write the opinion. He reversed the districtjudge.93 The
Supreme Court affirmed.9 4 It is the only case in the Supreme
Court's history where all nine justices are shown as authoring
the opinion. This was undoubtedly done to emphasize the
court's unanimous agreement to enforce the integration
decree.
One of the more humorous incidents I experienced on the
court involved Judge Matthes' responsibilities as Chief Judge.
At that time, we had only one staff law clerk. She wrote exclusively on state prisoner habeas corpus petitions. Judge Matthes felt that the staff law clerk was a "bleeding heart because
she takes the prisoner's side in every case." Judge Matthes
asked if I would work with her to see whether she could make
her analysis more balanced.
A month later, Judge Matthes called me in and told me he
had given up on the staff attorney and told me to discharge
her. I told him that he was ChiefJudge and if anyone was to be
fired, he should do it. I offered to talk to the staff law clerk and
tell her that we might be phasing out the job since the work
89. 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
90. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
91. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 32 (E.D. Ark.), rev'd, 257 F.2d 33 (8th
Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
92. Aaron, 257 F.2d at 33.
93. Id. at 40.
94. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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was not that substantial at the time, and that she should perhaps look for different work.
A week later, Judge Matthes called me in again and asked if I
had fired the staff law clerk. I smiled and said, "No, Charlie,
that's your job, not mine. I did talk to her." I always remember his response: "Don, I can see you just haven't had the experience of dealing with people. You have to learn to take the
bull by the horns. On Monday, I'm going to call Bob Tucker
and tell him to fire her." Charlie was too kind-hearted to do
the job himself. Bob Tucker, who was our clerk of court until
1980, was a dear, devoted friend to Judge Matthes. He and I
still laugh about "the firing of the staff law clerk."
Judge Matthes wrote some historic words in Aaron v.
Cooper,95 which I have always remembered. After he died, I
thought it would be most fitting to dedicate the number one
courtroom in St. Louis in his name. We have immortalized the
words that Judge Matthes wrote in Aaron with a plaque outside
the courtroom which reads: "We say the time has not yet come
in these United States when an order of a Federal Court must
be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in
the face of violent and
unlawful acts of individual citizens in
96
opposition thereto."

Judge Floyd Gibson was appointed by President Johnson to
the court in 1965. He had been a federal district judge and a
former Missouri state legislator. He was my immediate predecessor as Chief Judge. As a lawyer, he had been in the commercial banking field. He brought to the court a wealth of
experience in commercial transactions. He has been an outstanding judge and still sits as a senior circuit judge.
In 1970, when Justice Blackmun was appointed to the
Supreme Court, Don Ross of Omaha was appointed by President Nixon to take his place. Ross was a close friend to Senator Roman Hruska and at one time, was the Republican
National Committeeman from Nebraska. At one time early in
our careers, Don and I lived across the street from one another
in Omaha. His children often babysat for our little girls. Don
and I have been good friends for almost forty years. He has
been an excellent judge and still serves as a senior judge.
One other judge appointed to the Eighth Circuit during the
95. 257 F.2d at 33.
96. Id. at 40.
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1970s was Judge Smith Henley of Harrison, Arkansas, who
succeeded Judge Pat Mehaffy. Judge Henley had sat on many
of the Little Rock school cases as a district judge. He also
wrote the district court opinion in Holt v. Sarver,9 7 which held
that Arkansas' prison system was unconstitutional because its
combined practices constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Judge Van Oosterhout, Judge Vogel, and I affirmed that
decision.9 8
Judge William Webster was appointed to the Eighth Circuit
in 1973 from the United States district bench in the Eastern
District of Missouri. He served with our court until 1978 when
President Carter appointed him director of the FBI. President
Bush later appointed him to become the director of the CIA.
He was a highly respected and distinguished judge. The court
of appeals lost a great judge, but the nation has benefited from
his long service with the FBI and CIA. He is also a great
friend. We both love to tell the story about the time we were
playing golf in Washington with Bud Vieth, a former classmate
of mine from Iowa, and the then-managing partner in the prestigious law firm of Arnold & Porter. Also with us was Ben Civiletti, who succeeded Griffin Bell as Attorney General in 1979.
On the way home, Bud's car broke down. All of a sudden, the
Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the FBI,
the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit, and Bud found themselves hitchhiking to Bud's house.
COLLEAGUES ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

The Judicial Conference of the United States serves as a
"board of directors" for the federal court system. It was created by statute.9 9 It is composed of the Chief Judges of each
circuit, and one district judge member from each circuit. The
latter are elected by all the district and circuit judges of each
circuit. The twenty-six judges on the Conference represent
the twelve circuits and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court serves as the
presiding officer. As ChiefJudge, I was privileged to serve on
the Judicial Conference for twelve years.
The Conference functions primarily through committees
97. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
98. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
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and is greatly dependent upon reports and works of those
committees. The Conference meets twice a year, normally at
the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C. During my tenure on
the Court of Appeals, I have served under three ChiefJustices:
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chief Justice Warren Burger, and
the current Chief Justice, William Rehnquist. During my time
on the Judicial Conference, I served under the latter two.
In 1967, Chief Justice Warren, primarily through the influence of friends in the Justice Department, appointed me to the
important Trial Practice Committee of the Judicial Conference. At one time, this was the most important committee of
the Judicial Conference. However, the work of the committee
became so diverse that it was splintered off into several committees. When ChiefJustice Burger assumed his post, he abolished the Trial Practice Committee and assigned its
responsibilities into various other committees.
Between 1960 and 1970, Al Murrah, the Chief Judge of the
Tenth Circuit, was the chair of the Trial Practice Committee.
During that time, I had the pleasure of working with several
distinguished judges with whom I still enjoy friendships. On
the Trial Practice Committee, at that time, were the distinguished district judges Frank Kaufman of Baltimore and
Milton Pollack of New York. Milton, Frank and I became very
close friends and associates through the years. Also on that
committee was a district judge from Tennessee, Bob Taylor.
He later presided over several important, nationally publicized
criminal trials.
One of my most memorable experiences as a federal judge
occurred during a committee meeting in Washington. Our
committee was invited to a dinner with some of the new district
judges at the Supreme Court. At that dinner, I was seated between Justice Hugo Black and Justice John Harlan. You can
imagine the inspirational thrill I had as a young judge engaged
in a dinner conversation with two of the greatest Supreme
Court Justices who have ever served.
After Warren Burger became Chief Justice, I was appointed
to the important Appellate Rules Committee of the Conference. This was in 1973. Our committee was composed of
some of the great names in the law: Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit, John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit, John
Hastings of the Seventh Circuit, Bailey Aldrich of the First Cirhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/13
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cuit, and Bill Hastie Of the Third Circuit. I always felt that I
was a babe who sat at their feet. These were some of the outstanding jurists of the century, and for me to share thoughts
and exchanges with them was, and is still, an inspiring
memory.
Former Justice Abe Fortas was also on the committee. At
the time, he had left the Supreme Court and was back in private practice. One evening, when we met in Washington, Justice Fortas invited us to his home for dinner. After dinner, he
took me into his "music room" to view two Stradivarius violins
he kept under glass. There were no pictures of the Supreme
Court decorating the wall, as one might expect. Instead, there
were various photographs of Abe with such great musicians as
Pablo Casals and Issac Stern, with whom he had played at various concerts at the White House. I recall that he had played
for five Presidents. He was a talented viola player.
One political picture on the wall was a picture of the Truman
Cabinet members and their deputy secretaries. As I recall, Abe
was Undersecretary of the Interior. As I was looking at the
photo, I said to him, "There is one very unusual thing about
this picture." There were approximately twenty people in the
picture. "Abe, you are the only one living at the present time."
He acknowledged that he was well aware of that. Abe and I
became good friends and exchanged correspondence for several years prior to his death. He was a great lawyer and a talented justice. I always deemed his resignation from the
Supreme Court unfortunate.
Chief Justice Burger spent a great deal of time on administrative details. Many of us on the Judicial Conference were always amazed at his capacity to manage administrative details
and serve on the Supreme Court at the same time. During the
early days of the Gramm-Rudman Act,' the Chief Justice announced at the Judicial Conference that, to cut down on expenses, only one law clerk or one secretary could travel with a
district judge to sit away from his home base. This did not
save a great deal of money; in fact, it caused a great many
100. In order to eliminate the federal budget deficit, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, popularly known as the GrammRudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901922 (1988)). This act set a maximum deficit amount for federal spending for each of
the fiscal years 1986 through 1991, which intended to progressively reduce the deficit
amount to zero in 1991.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 13
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 18

problems for district judges who were willing to sit in other

districts where there existed a case of need. A senior district
judge from our circuit was asked to sit for three months in the
Middle District of Florida. Thejudge came to me and said that
the Judicial Conference Committee had turned down his request to take both his secretary and law clerk to Florida. He
stated he wanted to be able to take them both because it was
really necessary for both of them to be there. He suggested
that he would drive his own car down to Florida, rather than
fly, and his secretary and clerk would ride with him. In this
way, there would be only one travel expense. The Conference
Committee nevertheless turned him down. Under the awkward process, once the committee denied a request, permission had to be obtained from the ChiefJustice himself. I called
the Chief Justice and explained the situation and he gave me
his approval. However, six weeks later, he called me on the
telephone and told me that I had violated Judicial Conference
orders in allowing the district judge to take both the secretary
and law clerk. He had forgotten our earlier conversation.
In a more dramatic effort to comply with Gramm-Rudman,
in July of 1986, the Administrative Office, with the approval of
the Chief Justice, issued an order that there would be no more
civil jury trials because there was no money left to pay jurors.
As Chief Judge, I received a call from a district judge and lawyers in Arkansas who had scheduled a two-week product liability case involving a Japanese corporation.
The Japanese clients had flown to Arkansas for the trial, and
they were ready for trial but did not want to proceed without
the jury. The lawyers filed a petition of mandamus against the
district judge (who was sympathetic with their plight). I appointed a three-judge panel of our court to review the petition.
The panel issued an order directing the judge to hold a jury
trial.
The ChiefJustice was very disturbed. He later told me that I
was requiring the Director of the Administrative Office to violate the anti-deficiency law and also subjecting him to a criminal penalty. My immediate response was that the antideficiency law provided that monies could not be spent unless
otherwise authorized by law. It seemed to me the Seventh Amend-

ment of the United States Constitution required a jury trial. I
knew of no authority by which the Administrative Office or the
Chief Justice could suspend the Seventh Amendment. The
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/13
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jury trial went ahead. Fortunately, the order suspending the
jury was lifted when new funds became available, and there was
no appeal as to our order. Shortly afterward, I received a letter
from a lawyer who had read about the case. He wrote that, in
his opinion, this was my "finest hour" on the court. I do not
think that the Chief Justice agreed.
On another occasion, a district judge allowed a convicted
murderer to leave the state penitentiary (under guard) to serve
as a lawyer for another prisoner in a section 1983 suit. The
convicted felon was an excellent writ-writer and had written
many briefs for the complainant. The case was tried at the
other end of the state from where the penitentiary was located.
Our court heard about the situation, and the state attorney
general complained in the newspapers about the assignment.
The problem was that the Attorney General presented no papers-no official pleadings to prevent this-and then waited
until after the trial to complain about it. I am confident that
had there been a petition filed under the All Writs Act, °1 t our
court would have enjoined the district court from allowing the
prisoner to participate in the trial.
The assignment caused many security problems. When I
read about the assignment, I called the district judge and told
him that our court felt that allowing the prisoner to be released
from prison for that purpose involved too much risk and expense. I had no more talked to the district judge and been
assured that the situation would never arise again when I received a phone call from the Chief Justice. He was calling me
from an airport. He had just read of the incident in a newspaper and was very concerned. I assured him that I understood
his concern and that the situation had been handled and would
never happen again.
When ChiefJustice Burger stepped down and William Rehnquist took over, I served as chairman of the ChiefJudges Committee of the Judicial Conference. The Chief Judges of the
various courts of appeals always had an adjunct meeting with
the Judicial Conference. I wanted to make certain that the new
Chief Justice was agreeable to our functioning as we had in the
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988). The All Writs Act provides, in part, "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by act of Congress may issue all writs necessary and
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." Id.
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past and to pledge to him our full cooperation. He was kind
enough to arrange a luncheon for the two of us in his chambers when I was in Washington. We had a good visit, and I was
reassured that he supported the continued existence of the
Chief Judges Committee.
Like ChiefJustice Burger, ChiefJustice Rehnquist displayed
a talent for administration. One of his most notable administrative accomplishments was the reformation and streamlining
of the Judicial Conference. The Chief Justice now circulates a
consent-nondiscussion calendar prior to the Conference to allow the Conference to focus its discussion on those matters
which would benefit from or require exchanges, and therefore
avoid spending time on issues about which discussion is
neither necessary nor appropriate. Any matter may be moved
from the consent calendar to the discussion calendar at the request of any member of the Conference. This administrative
innovation focuses the Conference so that instead of taking
two or three days for meetings, which were mostly informational, the Conference now consists of a day or day and onehalf of substantive discussions. Everyone has been enthusiastic
about this change.
Serving on the Judicial Conference provided many rich experiences. During my tenure, I became well acquainted with
the members of the Supreme Court. The signet honor of serving on the Conference, however, was in working with the many
outstanding Chief Judges of the United States. During this
time, I had the esteemed privilege of working with distinguished judges like Frank Coffin, Lee Campbell and Stephen
Breyer of the First Circuit; the brilliant jurists Wilfred Feinberg
and Jim Oakes of the Second Circuit; the likeable Collins Seitz,
the scholarly John Gibbons, and the great humanitarian, Leon
Higginbotham, of the Third Circuit; the renowned Clement
Haynsworth, as well as my dear, departed friend, Harrison
Winter, of the Fourth Circuit. They are both now succeeded
by Sam Ervin, one of the ablest Chief Judges in the nation. I
also had the unique opportunity to observe and work with
Charles Clark of the Fifth Circuit, who possessed rare administrative genius; and the gifted judges of the Sixth Circuit, Pierce
Lively and Gilbert Merritt. On the Seventh Circuit were my
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long time friends Tom Fairchild, Walter Cummings, 0 2 and Bill
Bauer. I served with the talented Jim Browning, who served
on the judicial Conference as long as anyone, the dedicated
Ted Goodwin, and the energetic Cliff Wallace on the Ninth
Circuit; the marvelous ChiefJudges Oliver Seth and Bill Holloway of the Tenth Circuit; and my great friends John Godbold
and Gerald Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit.10 3 The remarkable
Howard Markey of the Federal Circuit served along with the
thoughtful Spottswood Robinson, and the brilliant Pat Wald
represented the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. I was privileged to also serve with their
successor, the able and talented Abner Mikva, a former United
States Congressman. The scholarly Edward Re represented
the Court of International Trade. These distinguished judges
have each left their mark on the United States judicial system.
History will regard them to be among the greatest circuit
judges of our time. It is these associations that I treasure most.
There were other rewarding experiences as well. On two occasions, the judicial Conference was invited to the White
House. One of these occasions was the historic moment in the
Rose Garden when President Reagan introduced Sandra Day
O'Connor, the first woman justice in our history. My wife and
I were in the front row and cherish the memory of this event. I
have also been privileged to attend, as a member of the Judicial Conference, the swearing-in ceremonies of Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy.
John Paul Stevens and I knew one another back when we
were circuit judges, and we have remained good friends over
the years. My visits to Washington also provided me opportunity to play golf withJohn and my old friends, Bill Webster and
Griffin Bell, the former Fifth Circuit judge who served as Attorney General. These are all memories to be cherished.
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT TODAY

As Chief Judge, I took an active role in trying to expedite
appointments to the judicial vacancies on our court. One con102. Fairchild, Cummings and I were appointed to the Courts of Appeals on the
same day by President Lyndon Johnson, July 6, 1966.
103. John and I had our Senate hearing at the same time in July of 1966. When
Judge Godbold took senior status, he served as the Director of the Federal Judicial
Center in Washington, D.C.
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stant, repetitive event in our "political world" is the delay
which results when the executive branch of the government
tries to make federal judicial appointments. This has been true
of both Republican and Democratic administrations.
Once I recall that an appointment was being held up because
the American Bar Association representative in our circuit told
me that he had nine individuals to investigate and that he was
going to arrange a dinner meeting sometime in the next four
to six weeks to meet a new nominee to our court. I wrote Chief
Justice Burger and members of the Conference that I felt the
American Bar Association was not expeditious because they
had too few people doing the investigations. One of the Conference members turned my letter over to the chair of the
American Bar Association committee in New York. I received
a blistering three page letter from him, with a copy to the Chief
Justice, telling me how misinformed I was. The next week,
however, I found out that the committee added another person
to our circuit to aid in the investigations. Our nominee was
interviewed the following week.
On two separate occasions, I went to Washington to visit the
Attorney General of the United States to try to expedite the
appointment process. The Justice Department is notorious in
delaying these appointments. The Judicial Conference had
complained every year about such delays, some lasting as long
as five years. When the vacancy arose to which Judge James
Loken, one of the newest members of the Eighth Circuit, was
appointed, I visited with Attorney General Thornburgh and
expressed the dire need we had in filling the vacancy. I do not
know whether this helped or not, but the vacancy, which had
been pending for over a year, was filled within a few months.
Judge Loken was nominated just prior to the hearings for
Justice Souter's appointment to the Supreme Court. Congress
was set to adjourn shortly after the Souter hearings, and if
Loken could not get his Senate hearing prior to the fall recess,
he would have been unable to take his place on the court until
the following spring. I attended the Souter hearings, and during a recess, I spoke with Senator Biden and his administrative
aide about expediting Loken's hearing. They told me that
there were thirty-seven appointees ahead of Loken, and because Loken had just been nominated, a hearing before adjournment would be impossible.
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I had known Senator Howell Heflin from Alabama back in
the 1960s when we were both trial lawyers and had served on
the Board of Directors of the American Trial Lawyers Association. I visited with Howell about our emergency. His aide
called my office the next week and told me he was sorry, but to
expedite Loken's hearing appeared to be impossible. The next
day, he called again to see if Loken could be in Washington
next Friday. Judge Loken went, and he began his service with
us at the start of the year. Whatever works, works!
After Judge Floyd Gibson took senior status in 1980, we had
a vacancy on our court for over three years. President Carter's
nominee to the court, Howard Sachs, presently Chief Judge of
the Western District of Missouri, lost out because of the 1982
election. Another year or more went by. I held a press interview and cited several candidates who had been interviewed by
the Justice Department, reciting that they were all competent,
and complained that the Justice Department was delaying the
entire process. We were in dire need of having that appointment filled. I was called into Washington by the Attorney General, William French Smith. A deputy attorney general took
out a red circled copy of the Minneapolis Tribune quoting my
statement and said in a raised voice, "Whose job is it to fill this
vacancy-yours or the President's?" I explained that, in all
due respect, my only concern was not who would be appointed, but to have the appointment take place. At the end of
the meeting, we parted friends. The assistant said, "In other
words, you only want a warm body." The trouble was that
warm body took a long time in coming.
Judy Whittaker, the daughter-in-law of Justice Charles Whittaker, was from Kansas City. I knew her through various trial
lawyer meetings I had attended. She is an excellent lawyer and
a good friend. One day in 1983, while I was sitting on the
court in St. Louis, she called me. She told me that the Justice
Department had just called her and told her that President
Reagan would call her that week to tell her of her nomination
to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. I was almost as pleased
as she was. My wife and I drove through Kansas City that Friday night and had a celebration dinner with Judy and her husband, Kent. She had called her family, and we even planned
the date that she would be sworn in. Unfortunately, the phone
call from President Reagan never came. At the last minute, a
conservative political group in Missouri opposed her and ultiPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
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mately Lyn Nofziger, the President's political advisor, recommended that she not be nominated.
While this issue was pending, I made a nuisance of myself
with Fred Fielding, the counsel to the President. He liked Judy
very much and was favorably impressed with her. Unfortunately, Nofziger was the hatchet man, and Fielding lost control. When it was announced that Judy would not get the
appointment, I sent a wire to Attorney General William French
Smith and Fred Fielding that read: "What you have done to
Judy Whittaker this day is both unconscionable and unpardonable." Later when I saw Fred Fielding, he told me that he
agreed with my wire. This was in 1983. Unfortunately, the
Eighth Circuit still is waiting for its first female judge.
Judge Ted McMillian was appointed in 1978. He is the only
minority judge on the court. He and I first met in Aspen, Colorado, high in the middle of the Rocky Mountains, where we
were attending a seminar. Judge McMillian has been a champion of civil rights for all individuals. Before being appointed
to the Eighth Circuit, he sat on the Missouri Court of Appeals
and served as a state circuit judge. He has been a great judge
on our court and still sits as an active judge.
Judge Richard Arnold, who joined the court in 1980, has
now succeeded me as Chief Judge of the court. Chief Judge
Arnold has established a brilliant record on the court and has
always manifested a concern for the constitutional rights of all
citizens. It has been a privilege to work with him.
Starting in 1982, the court began to take on new faces. In
fact, since 1982, as ChiefJudge, I have presided over the investiture of nine new judges, including Judge Arnold. The most
recent being Judge David Hansen of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, who
was an outstanding district court judge for some five or six
years before he came on the court. Ten months before that,
Judge James Loken, a distinguished Minnesota lawyer, was appointed to the court by President Bush. Judge Loken and
Judge Hansen are the two Bush appointments to the court.
The other six "new" appointments were appointed by President Reagan. They are: Judges George Fagg, John Gibson,
Pasco Bowman, Frank Magill, C. Arlen Beam, and Roger
Wollman.
Judge Fagg was a highly respected state district court judge
in Iowa. Judge John R. Gibson had a brief appointment as a
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/13
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district judge before being appointed to the Eighth Circuit.
Judge Roger Wollman came to the court after distinguished
service as Chief Justice of the South Dakota Supreme Court.
Judge Pasco Bowman is a former dean of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School. Judge Frank Magill was an excellent trial lawyer from Fargo, North Dakota, and Judge Beam
was a federal district court judge from Nebraska. Their diverse
backgrounds and skills have benefited the court.
Today, the Eighth Circuit is in the process of planning five
new courthouses in five of the states of the Eighth Circuit. °4
We have expansive automation programs and training programs. We have increased the number of personnel multifold.
When I became Chief Judge, we had approximately twelve
people in the clerk's office. Today we have close to forty.
There are many more magistrate judges and bankruptcy
judges now than ever before. These changes were impelled by
the almost geometric increase in the overall dockets of this
court and the district courts.
My

TERM AS CHIEF JUDGE

When I became ChiefJudge of the court in 1980, the administrative responsibilities were not nearly as numerous or complex as they are today. In the beginning of my tenure as Chief
Judge, there was little administration to perform and most of it
was fairly simple. Most of the administrative work left to the
ChiefJudge involved presiding over the judicial council, which
conducted the "business" of all judicial officers within the circuit. As the court expanded, however, the workload expanded,
and the administrative requirements and the duties of the
Chief Judge greatly increased.
Suffice it to say, the work of being a Chief Judge, at least in
my judgment, is no longer "fun." It requires doing a great
deal of paper work, attending many meetings, and maintaining
constant contact with administrative heads. The administrative
responsibilities, in effect, totally preempt the regular performance of a chief judge's judicial duties.
One of the primary responsibilities has been chairing and
directing our annual Judicial Conference. This has been an
104. New federal court buildings are in the planning stages in St. Louis, Kansas
City, Omaha, Minneapolis, and Fargo.
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"open conference," and lawyers of all races, ages, and genders
are encouraged to come. We have strived to conduct outstanding educational conferences. The collegiality between
the bar and the bench has greatly improved because of the success of these conferences.
The internal administrative operation of the Eighth Circuit is
presently an efficient operation. Over the years we have constantly refined our procedures, and our internal operation facilitates an efficient operation of our docket and assists the
attorneys and the public in every way possible. We have an
outstanding circuit executive, June Boadwine, and a capable
clerk of court, Michael Gans. Our twelve staff law clerks in St.
Louis are headed by staff attorney Sheila Greenbaum, a very
able person. The staff attorneys work with the judges on
processing no-argument and pro se cases. These cases are getting more numerous, therefore, the court depends upon the
assistance of this auxiliary staff to aid us in processing our
heavy docket. When I became Chief Judge, our library staff
involved only two people. Today we have approximately
twenty individuals working in our library system. Ann Fessenden in St. Louis, our head librarian, manages and supervises the court's eight branch libraries. John Martin, a former
federal arbitrator, heads our pre-argument settlement program, where we attempt to settle cases which might be resolved accordingly, thus conserving judicial resources.
Although the court had sat in St. Paul at least once or twice a
year before 1980, a major move to benefit the bar occurred in
1982, when we opened a divisional court in St. Paul. In 1980,
several lawyers from Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota complained to me about the long distances and time involved in going to St. Louis for short arguments. A lawyer
from Bismarck, North Dakota, once wrote me that it took four
days in the winter to travel in and out of St. Louis for a twenty
minute argument. Since many cases argued before our court
involve government counsel or counsel appointed by the court
and paid by the government, we would save government monies by setting up a divisional court in St. Paul. The Eighth Circuit renovated the space on the fifth floor of the Federal
Building in St. Paul and constructed two new courtrooms and a
divisional clerk's office. In order to facilitate the move, I decided to move my base from Omaha to St. Paul. We now try to
assign cases, whenever possible, on a geographic basis.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/13
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The move was not altogether popular with some of the Missouri court employees and judges. They were afraid that my
moving to St. Paul signaled the end of St. Louis as the seat of
the court. Notwithstanding my assurances to the contrary, one
judge once told me that the move was not immediate, but that
I was attempting to do it "brick by brick." This was several
years ago. I believe that everyone now is reassured that St.
Louis will remain the seat of the court. I believe that the entire
court and bar now see the divisional court in St. Paul as benefiting everyone concerned.
In the past several years, many important cases have passed
through the Eighth Circuit. Significant abortion cases, such as
Reproductive Health Service v. Webster' °5 and Hodgson v. Minnesota,' 0 6 were heard in our court. We have heard several significant civil rights cases.' 0 7 We have also heard important cases
concerning both the free exercise and establishment
clauses. 0 8 In addition, we have had numerous school integration cases arising out of Kansas City, St. Louis, and Little
Rock.' °9 Some of the most important Indian jurisdiction cases
have been reviewed by our court." t0 Overall, the Eighth Cir105. 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
106. 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
107. See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983),
rev'd sub nom., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (gender
discrimination).
108. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (Minnesota law permitting state taxpayers to claim a deduction for certain
expenses incurred in educating their children does not violate the Establishment
Clause by providing financial assistance to sectarian institutions); Board of Educ. of
Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989), aft'd, 496 U.S.
226 (1990) (holding that equal access must be accorded a student Christian club
where the school district permits access to other non-curriculum related student organizations); Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 783
(1983) (holding that the practice of opening each session of the Nebraska legislature
with a prayer by a chaplin, paid for with public funds, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
109. See, e.g.,Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 942 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1991); Board of
Educ. v. Missouri, 936 F.2d 993 (8th Cir. 1991); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski
County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1990); Scoggins v. Board of
Educ., 853 F.2d 1472 (8th Cir. 1988); Lidell v. Board of Educ., 851 F.2d 1104 (8th
Cir. 1988); Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983).
110. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that absent tribal consent, South Dakota had no jurisdiction over
highways running through Indian lands in the state), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009
(1991); Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that Major Crimes
Act did not divest Indian tribes of sovereign power to punish their own members for
violations of tribal law); Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding
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cuit has had more than its share of significant litigation involving national issues.
With the advent of the sentencing guidelines authorized by
Congress," l we are now inundated with many more appeals.
Our experience, along with other circuits, is that the guidelines
are extremely punitive and unfair. Judicial discretion has been
virtually abolished and prosecutorial sentencing is taking
place. Hopefully, Congress will recognize the guidelines for
the travesty that they are and will restore judicial discretion so
that sentences can be justly individualized. However, I do not
anticipate many changes in the near future.
CONCLUSION

When Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, he wrote that "all proceedings,
like all rights, are really against persons."' "1 2 Great judges
never lose sight of the human concerns and relationships all
cases involve. Whether it is a defendant in a criminal case, a
land dispute, or a corporate restructuring, people are involved.
The distinguished jurists who leave their mark on history are
the ones who recognize that compassion for our fellow man is
the root and end of all law. This has been the mark of the
judges with whom I have been privileged to serve. It has been
the honor of my life to serve with them.
that tribal courts are without criminal jurisdiction over non-members, including nonmember Indians).
11. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
112. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 55 N.E. 812, 817 (Mass. 1900).
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